Last Updated on 2026 年 4 月 1 日 by 総合編集組
Iran Regime’s War Decision-Making Exposed: 145% Defense Budget Surge, 60% Industrial Loss, and 5 Key Power Factions in 2026 Conflict
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, triggered by the joint U.S.-Israeli military operation “Operation Epic Fury” launched on February 28, 2026, has entered a critical phase. As of April 1, 2026, the war has lasted 33 days, fundamentally reshaping Iran’s internal power structure following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This comprehensive overview examines the decision-making dynamics within the Iranian regime, focusing on the positions of major factions regarding the continuation of the war, economic pressures, military realities, and social sentiment.
Power Reorganization and Mojtaba Khamenei’s Leadership Logic After Ali Khamenei’s passing, his son Mojtaba Khamenei quickly assumed leadership. Despite initial questions about his legitimacy, he stabilized his position through deep alignment with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mojtaba is not merely an inheritor but an institutionalizer of “Khamenei-ism,” with regime preservation as the core of his decision-making. In his Nowruz address, he introduced the “Comprehensive Resilience” doctrine, framing the current conflict as the third major war of the Iranian nation against external forces seeking to dismantle and control it. He links regime survival to Iranian civilizational identity to mobilize broader nationalist sentiments, including secular groups previously critical of the theocratic system.
Mojtaba’s core strategic objectives span four key areas. In military and security, the focus is on asymmetric deterrence and regional attrition, authorizing the IRGC to conduct sustained pressure on U.S. bases and allied infrastructure. Economically, the regime pursues monetization of the Strait of Hormuz through a “damage compensation package” involving high passage fees. For internal governance, efforts center on eliminating unpredictability via enhanced control over elections and public opinion by supervisory committees and security agencies. Diplomatically, the policy emphasizes anti-American and regional confrontation, maintaining the resilience of the “Axis of Resistance” while rejecting conditional surrender.
Mojtaba firmly leans toward prolonged fighting, believing that as long as Iran maintains basic system operations and continues impacting global energy markets, the opposing administration will eventually yield due to economic pressures.
The Pragmatic Camp’s Warnings: President Pezeshkian’s Isolated Position In contrast to the hardline stance at the top, the executive branch led by President Masoud Pezeshkian displays significant concern. As a representative of the pragmatic faction within the system, Pezeshkian finds himself increasingly isolated with limited influence. His public rift with IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi centers on the total economic and social costs of the war.
In internal reports, Pezeshkian warns that without an immediate ceasefire, Iran’s economy could collapse within three to four weeks. Precision strikes on core industrial facilities, including the Mobarakeh and Khuzestan steel plants, as well as power and fuel reserves, have resulted in over 60% loss of foundational production capacity. The president advocates restoring civilian government control over resource distribution and positively responding to the China-Pakistan “Five-Point Peace Initiative” to seek a diplomatic exit.
However, senior IRGC leaders dismiss these concerns as psychological warfare and signs of weakness. Although Pezeshkian remains a nominal member of the National Security Council, his actual decision-making power has been sidelined, leaving him primarily responsible for managing civilian aftermath issues caused by the war.
The IRGC: War Machine and Interest Community The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains the most powerful “war faction” within the regime. Following the loss of several high-ranking commanders, including Navy Commander Alireza Tangsiri and Defense Minister Amir Nasirzadeh, the IRGC has shown even stronger retaliatory will rather than retreat.
To prepare for potential ground warfare, the IRGC launched the large-scale “Janfada” (Sacrifice of Life) recruitment campaign at the end of March, sending mobilization orders nationwide via communication systems. This reflects an intention to transform the war into a civilianized and guerrilla-style conflict, using the scale of a “people’s war” to deter U.S. ground invasion plans.
In the 1405 (2026) budget, defense and security spending increased by 145%, reaching a total of $9.23 billion. The IRGC received approximately $1.88 billion in direct allocation, while the regular Artesh forces received only $670 million. This extreme imbalance reinforces the IRGC’s dominant role as the sole leader in wartime decision-making but also sows seeds of internal military division.
Marginalization and Morale Crisis of the Regular Army (Artesh) Unlike the IRGC’s aggressive posture, Iran’s regular armed forces, the Artesh, lean more toward a defensive ceasefire. Intelligence indicates that institutional friction between the Artesh and IRGC has reached a peak.
Shocking reports reveal that the IRGC has refused to transport wounded Artesh soldiers to their controlled hospitals, despite abundant medical supplies including blood reserves. IRGC officials cite priority allocation to missile units as the reason, leading to strong resentment among regular army rank-and-file soldiers.
Collective desertions have been reported in border provinces. Soldiers face severe ammunition shortages (only 10-20 rounds per person) and lack basic food and water supplies. For Artesh commanders, the war is rapidly depleting decades of traditional military assets, creating urgent calls for a professional ceasefire before total disintegration.
Legislative and Security Council Dynamics: Ghalibaf and Zolqadr Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as a key strategic coordinator. A former IRGC commander, he maintains an extremely hardline diplomatic position, publicly rejecting conditional negotiations with the United States.
In late March, Ghalibaf declared that Iran stands on the verge of “historic victory” and will not accept any externally imposed conditions. He dismissed the U.S. 15-point ceasefire proposal (including dismantling nuclear facilities and halting support for proxies) as unreasonable and threatened that any U.S. forces entering Iranian territory would face severe consequences. His stance represents the conservative core of the regime, aiming to force withdrawal through escalated threats.
Meanwhile, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) leadership shifted to hardliner Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr, replacing the more pragmatic Ali Larijani. This change signals a full transition to IRGC-dominated security policy, where any compromise attempts are likely to be blocked at the committee level.
Monetization of the Strait of Hormuz and Global Economic Leverage One of Mojtaba’s most significant economic decisions is the monetization of the Strait of Hormuz. This goes beyond military blockade to become a new form of state-level economic pressure. The “damage compensation strategy” includes:
- Security passage fees of approximately $2 million per oil tanker
- Tiered taxation adjusted by nationality and cargo type, with priority on RMB payments
- Regional reconstruction tax requiring Gulf states to pay $50 per barrel
- Ban on U.S. and Israeli vessels, even under other flags
Iran claims legal rights based on control of the northern shore and key islands. This approach demonstrates an attempt to drag the global economy into prolonged disruption using geographic advantage, creating the strongest bargaining chip at the negotiation table.
Societal Division: Propaganda Networks vs. Public Anxiety The war has created multi-layered impacts on Iranian society. Under heavy internet restrictions (connectivity down to only 4%), the government uses domestically developed Android apps to manipulate public opinion. The IRGC operates over 60 virtual social media accounts that rapidly shifted to produce AI-generated content praising the late leader and fabricating images of destroyed enemy bases.
In pro-regime rallies, supporters describe the conflict as a war of dignity, emphasizing unity under leadership. However, in private channels and underground forums, anxiety dominates. Residents express panic over doubled oil and food prices. Anonymous comments question why the nation must sacrifice for a deceased leader and unrealistic ambitions while children starve in shelters.
A secret social sentiment assessment shows 49.6% of respondents view overseas opposition groups as disconnected from domestic reality, while 37.9% resent the regime’s forced linkage of nationalism to its own survival. Many worry that orders preventing evacuation from ports like Chabahar effectively use civilians as human shields.
International Mediation Deadlock and Economic Costs Negotiation positions remain deadlocked. The U.S. demands near-unconditional surrender, including full denuclearization and opening of the Strait. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterizes airstrikes as “ecocide” and attacks on civilizational identity. The China-Pakistan Five-Point Peace Initiative receives support from pragmatists but cold treatment from hardliners.
Economically, the war has pushed Iran toward the abyss. Industrial output dropped 70% due to strikes on steel and petrochemical facilities. 90% of food and medicine imports are blocked. Daily military spending reaches about $1 billion, while energy exports have nearly halted under force majeure declarations. Most private businesses can survive only one more month under network and power rationing.
Strategic Insights and Future Outlook as of April 1, 2026 Iran currently presents a contradictory picture: the upper power structure trends toward extreme hardline ideology, while grassroots administration and regular forces face severe material and morale crises.
Hardliners (Mojtaba, IRGC, Ghalibaf) pursue a strategy of “inflicting pain to force cessation,” believing attacks on bases, energy route blockades, and propaganda can shift U.S. domestic opinion. Pragmatists (Pezeshkian and diplomats) advocate “damage control to save the nation,” warning of imminent economic collapse and potential mass uprisings. The regular army (Artesh) operates in a state of passive resentment, raising risks of frontline collapse or defection in case of ground invasion.
With the U.S. deadline for striking energy facilities approaching on April 6, internal power struggles may intensify. While hardliners currently dominate, a full economic shutdown could trigger palace shifts or military-led power transitions toward accepting ceasefire terms under the China-Pakistan initiative.
For international observers, Iran on April 1, 2026, is not a unified fortress but a complex polity with widening internal fissures under external pressure. Whether Mojtaba’s “Comprehensive Resilience” proves illusory will ultimately be decided by the Iranian people’s lived experience of hardship and the regular army’s collapsing morale.
